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Richard G. Anderson and Kevin L. Kliesen
The increasingly rapid productivity growth that began in the 1990s was the defining economic
event of the decade and a major topic of debate among Federal Reserve policymakers. A key aspect
of the debate was the contrast between information contained in aggregate data, which initially
suggested little productivity gain, and anecdotal firm-level evidence, which hinted at the produc-
tivity acceleration. The authors revisit this debate from the actual FOMC transcripts. Their study
illustrates the process by which policymakers filter incoming data to identify changes in underly-
ing fundamental trends. (JEL E52, E58)
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during that period; we leave that as a topic for
future research.
In January 2004, Chairman Greenspan sum-
marized the role of the productivity revolution in
FOMC policymaking in a speech at the American
Economic Association meeting (Greenspan, 2004):
The rise in structural productivity growth
was not obvious in the official data on gross
product per hour worked until later in the
decade, but precursors had emerged earlier.
The pickup in new bookings and order back-
logs for high-tech capital goods in 1993 seemed
incongruous given the sluggish economic envi-
ronment at the time. Plant managers apparently
were reacting to what they perceived to be ele-
vated prospective rates of return on the newer
technologies, a judgment that was confirmed
as orders and profits continued to increase
through 1994 and 1995. Moreover, even though
hourly labor compensation and profit margins
were rising, prices were being contained,
imply  ing increasing growth in output per hour.
T
his analysis, based on public verbatim
transcripts of Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) meetings, explores
how the members of the FOMC adapted
monetary policy from 1983 to 2003 in response
to changing productivity growth.1 A major chal-
lenge in monetary policymaking is recognizing
changes in economic trends as they occur, that
is, learning.2 Thomas Sargent has explored, in a
number of articles, how policymakers who begin
with a flawed (or incomplete) model can, with
experience through learning, converge on an
“approximate but good enough” model of the
economy.3 The productivity acceleration is too
recent for us to assess whether this occurred
1 The FOMC transcripts, searchable by meeting date, are available on
the website of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomc_historical.htm).
2 Almost all histories of the Federal Reserve contain some element
of policymakers learning about and responding to a changing econ-
omy (e.g., see Meltzer, 2003, and Friedman and Schwartz, 1963).
3 See, for example, Sargent (2001) and papers cited therein.
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structural productivity growth that was appar-
ent from 1995 forward, we at the Fed were able
to be much more accommodative to the rise in
economic growth than our past experiences
would have deemed prudent. We were moti-
vated, in part, by the view that the evident
structural economic changes rendered suspect,
at best, the prevailing notion in the early 1990s
of an elevated and reasonably stable NAIRU
[non-accelerating inflation rate of unemploy-
ment]. Those views were reinforced as inflation
continued to fall in the context of a declining
unemployment rate that by 2000 had dipped
below 4 percent in the United States for the
first time in three decades.
Recent empirical studies confirm that FOMC
decisions under Chairman Greenspan’s leadership
resembled an exercise in risk management. Killian
and Manganelli (2008), for example, conclude
that FOMC decisions during his tenure are “better
described in terms of the Fed weighing upside
and downside risks to their objectives rather than
simply responding to the conditional mean of
inflation and the output gap”; further, they reject
the familiar hypothesis that FOMC decisions were
consistent with a generalized Taylor rule based on
expected utility maximization with quadratic and
symmetric preferences in inflation and output.
The nearest antecedent to our analysis is
Blinder and Reis (2005), who use a Taylor rule–
like framework to formalize the concept of a
“Greenspan standard” that “cherishes option
value” and “pure period-by-period discretion.”4
Our analysis, at least in part, extends that of
Blinder and Reis.
THE DATA
At each FOMC meeting, members’ decisions
are informed by (i) the staff’s summary of incom-
ing published data and (ii) the staff forecast.
Figures 1A and 1B compare forecasts of labor
productivity growth at four-quarter and one-
quarter, horizons, respectively, with the corre-
sponding first-published observed values. Staff
forecasts during the early 1980s overpredicted
productivity growth after the 1980 recession ended
and underpredicted growth during the subsequent
slowdown. Staff projections also missed a turning
point at the start of the 1990 recession and the
productivity acceleration that began in 1995. By
1998, staff projections of productivity growth
tended to increase, tracking incoming published
data. Staff forecasts tracked productivity well
during the post-2000 recession—but failed to cap-
ture the later acceleration. The forecast errors are
not symmetric; the staff forecasts more often (and
by larger amounts) underpredicted rather than
overpredicted productivity growth. 
Figure 2 displays staff forecasts and initially
published data for real gross domestic product
(GDP), an essential part of the productivity fore-
cast. It is evident that forecast misses in predicting
output growth caused a large part of the misses
in predicting labor productivity—the forecast
error patterns are similar both at the four-quarter
(Figure 2A) and one-quarter horizons (Figure 2B).
Because the FOMC was concerned with gross
national product (GNP), not GDP, during the
1980s, for completeness Figures 3A and 3B dis-
play real GNP for that period; the conclusion is
unchanged.
THE 1980s
The ability of information and communica-
tions technology (ICT) to increase productivity
was widely acknowledged during the “high-tech”
boom of the 1980s—Wynne (2002), for example,
notes that a computer was Time magazine’s “Man
of the Year” in 1982. Discussions of productivity
appear frequently in the FOMC transcripts as early
as 1983, focused on separating cyclical from trend
productivity growth and correctly measuring
productivity growth in the services-producing
sector. Most often, staff projections of trend growth
extrapolated the 1970s 1 to 1½ percent pace. At
the May 1983 meeting, for example, the staff pro-
jected near-term productivity growth at a 3½
Anderson and Kliesen
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4 Taylor (2005) stresses that the “Taylor rule” embodies general
principles of good policymaking as much as it is a proscriptive
policy rule. In this sense, Greenspan followed a Taylor rule–like
regime.percent annual rate, reflecting cyclical effects;
trend growth was projected at a 1 percent rate
during 1983, increasing to 1¼ to 1½ percent for
1984—a pace that Chairman Volcker labeled
“pessimistic.” In their defense, the staff noted
that they had increased their projection from a
previous ¾ of 1 percent rate. At the July meeting,
the staff maintained the same projection, “just a
little over 1 percent” to “in the 1¼ percent range.”
Committee members during the 1980s increasingly
requested the staff to quantify the degree of uncer-
tainty in their estimates, especially any downward
bias—in counterpoint, members offered anecdotes
from both the manufacturing and service sectors
to suggest that the staff estimates were low. At the
May 1984 meeting, for example, President Frank E.
Morris (Boston Fed) and Chairman Volcker noted
that the capital-goods boom underway was sub-
stantially “all electronics” and hence augured
well for productivity gains. The staff, however,
held fast to their forecast of modest labor produc-
tivity growth.
At the July 1984 meeting, trend productivity
growth again was projected at a 1¼ percent pace.
President Morris cited anecdotal evidence that
firms were expecting “extraordinarily high pro-
ductivity” from new capital, consistent with the
perceived high cost of capital funding. The staff
defended their projected 1¼ percent trend pro-
ductivity growth rate by noting that it was twice
the then-estimated 0.6 percent pace of the 1970s.
The discussion of the services-producing
sectors at the November 1983 meeting was typi-
cal for the FOMC: President Theodore H. Roberts
(St. Louis Fed) asked whether the economy’s shift
toward services and away from manufacturing
was adequately incorporated in staff projections:
On the productivity [issue]. I guess you took
into account this major change from manufac-
turing to services in the 1970s as one of the fac-
tors holding back productivity. With services
now such a large part of the economy, would
that from here on out tend to cause the same
or an increased rate of productivity if it stabi-
lized, let’s say?
The staff response highlighted the risk of measure-
ment error:
The bulk of the research that was done, as we
discussed earlier, was unable to pin that down
for the 1970s. Most of the research showed that
productivity slowed in service industries as
well as in manufacturing industries. The pat-
tern of the slowdown was at least the same
across different types of industries, so we were
unable to pin this productivity slowdown on
the growing services sector. Looking ahead and
having the services sector be one of the growing
sectors, I’m not sure that that should detract
from the things that seem to be important in
the productivity slowdown. However unde-
fined they may be. There are some technologi-
cal changes that could affect the services sector
as well as manufacturing.
President Roberts responded by asserting his
belief that the services sector was beginning to
experience increased productivity—“for the short
run anyway.” Skeptical members pressed the
argument that service-sector data were plagued
by mismeasurement. Subsequent data seemed to
offer more support to skeptical Committee mem-
bers than to the staff. At the September 1986 meet-
ing, for example, Governor Wayne Angell argued:
“Productivity in the service sector is low but I
don’t think we know how to measure it. Produc  -
tivity in the goods producing sector remains right
at the 3.2 percent level that it has been at for some
time.” Both Governor Angell and Chairman
Volcker continued their criticism at the following
meeting (November 1986). The staff acknowledged
that incoming data for the manufacturing sector
suggested “fairly substantial increases in produc-
tivity…For this cycle the gains are much more
favorable in comparison to past cyclical experience
than for the rest of the economy.” Governor Angell
repeated his suspicion of the measurements:
Of course, what this means—and I’ve had
several conversations with our staff over this—
is that, with productivity in manufacturing
doing what it is and the way we go about meas-
uring it, we have to have negative productivity
in the service sector. And that raises the ques-
tion as to how we measure productivity in the
service sector; the fact of the matter is that we
really don’t. So there is some kind of strange
averaging process going on there. I think there’s
really grave doubt as to what our productivity
in the service sector is. But if productivity in
Anderson and Kliesen
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Labor Productivity, Nonfarm Business Sector: Initial Published Data and Forecast Error 
(Increase During the Next Four Quarters, Percent Annual Rate, Quarterly)
NOTE: The figure examines the accuracy of staff forecasts of the change in productivity during a four-quarter period that begins with
the quarter in which an FOMC meeting occurred. The measure is calculated as follows: The BLS publishes labor productivity data eight
times each year; we use the four issues that contain quarterly initial (first-time published) measurements. The figure compares the staff
forecasts with the initial data subsequently published by the BLS. The last forecast shown is for the period ending 2004:Q3.Anderson and Kliesen
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Labor Productivity, Nonfarm Business Sector: Initial Published Data and Forecast Error 
(Increase During the Previous Quarter, Percent Annual Rate, Quarterly)
NOTE: The figure examines the accuracy of staff estimates of the productivity growth that occurred during the quarter immediately
preceding the quarter in which the FOMC meeting occurred and before publication of an estimate for that quarter by the BLS. Our
measure is calculated as follows: The BLS publishes labor productivity data eight times each year; we use the four issues that contain
quarterly initial (first-time published) measurements. The figure compares the staff estimates with the initial data subsequently published
by the BLS. The last estimate shown is for 2003:Q3.Anderson and Kliesen
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Real GDP Growth: FOMC Staff Forecast, Initial Published Data, and Forecast Error
(Average Growth During the Next Four Quarters, Percent Annual Rate, Quarterly)
NOTE: The figure examines the accuracy of staff forecasts of real GDP growth during a four-quarter period that begins with the quarter
in which an FOMC meeting occurred. Our measure is calculated as follows: The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) publishes real GDP
data 12 times each year; we use the 4 quarterly initial (“advance”) estimates. The figure compares the staff forecasts with the initial
data subsequently published by the BEA. The last forecast shown is for the period ending 2004:Q3.Anderson and Kliesen
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Real GDP Growth: FOMC Staff Forecast, Initial Published Data, and Forecast Error
(Growth During the Previous Quarter, Percent Annual Rate, Quarterly) 
NOTE: The figure examines the accuracy of staff estimates of the real GDP growth that occurred during the quarter immediately preced-
ing the quarter in which the FOMC meeting occurred and before publication of an estimate by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
Our measure is calculated as follows: The BEA publishes real GDP data 12 times each year; we use the 4 quarterly initial (“advance”)
estimates. The figure compares the staff estimates with the initial data subsequently published by the BEA. The last estimate shown is
for 2003:Q3.Anderson and Kliesen
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Staff Forecast Next 4 Quarters
Figure 3A
Real GNP Growth: FOMC Staff Forecast, Initial Published Data, and Forecast Error
(Growth During the Next Quarter, Percent Annual Rate, Quarterly)Anderson and Kliesen
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Real GNP Growth: FOMC Staff Forecast, Initial Published Data, and Forecast Error
(Growth During the Next Quarter, Percent Annual Rate, Quarterly)the service sector is stronger than we’re meas-
uring then that means, of course, that our econ-
omy is doing a little better than we are
measuring. So there are those two aspects that
are very interesting.
Chairman Volcker teased, “You don’t think more
computers mean less productivity?” to which
Governor Angell responded, “No.” Pressing further
at the December 1986 meeting, Governor Angell
asked, “How much different does productivity
look if you differentiate between the service sector
and the goods producing sector?”—to which the
staff answered:
Well, we don’t really have good data, as you
know, for well over a year. The evidence that
we have suggests that manufacturing produc-
tivity is probably rising 3½ to 4 percent. Service
sector productivity is just really quite poor. So,
we are getting strong productivity gains: that
is important in this forecast. In terms of poten-
tial growth, we are trying to look at trend pro-
ductivity for the economy in total, but there
is a great deal of variation among sectors.
Governor Angell followed up:
Then it is possible that we really don’t measure
productivity in the service sector and don’t
measure the value of output in the service sec-
tor. We just assume productivity is going to be
zero in the service sector, and lo and behold
it is.
But the staff disagreed: “No, I think there is a
little more information than that. Let’s say it is
open to question but there is a little more informa-
tion than an assumption of zero.” Such discus-
sions continued throughout the 1980s. As the
decade closed, at the November 1989 meeting,
the staff’s projected trend labor productivity
growth was little changed from that of the previ-
ous decade: 1¼ percent. In fairness, data available
in early 2010 vindicate the staff: Labor productiv-
ity growth in the nonfarm business sector averaged
1.4 percent per year during the decade.
THE 1990s
The FOMC’s views on productivity changed
during the 1990s, albeit slowly.
1992
The transcripts during the recession of 1990-91
contain little discussion of productivity. When
discussion resumed in 1992, the staff projected
trend labor productivity growth at the same pace
as that of the prior decade. Transcripts for the first
half of 1992 contain no new analysis of productiv-
ity. At the August meeting, for example, the pro-
jected rate was a 1 percent pace, similar to the
1980s. Both President Gary H. Stern (Minneapolis
Fed) and Chairman Greenspan questioned the
degree of uncertainty in that figure. The Chairman
asked: “Is there a tendency that that 1 percent
might be higher?” The staff, in reply, argued that
their caution during the 1980s, when they refused
to increase their projection, later was confirmed
by the data:
If one thinks back to where we were in the early
’80s, coming out of that recession there was a
tendency, I think, for many people to overesti-
mate the improvement in productivity. There
was talk then that the trend had improved to
maybe 2 percent or in excess of 2 percent and
it turned out to be a disappointment that as we
progressed through the decade we didn’t see
that kind of improvement. I think it’s always
difficult when you see the good increases in
productivity early on [in a recovery] to know
exactly how much is trend and how much is
cyclical.
At the December meeting, the Chairman noted
that the early 1990s had been a “productivity-
driven recovery” with little increase in hours
worked, “unprecedented in the context of how
little economic growth we have had since March
1991.” He offered two explanations. The first he
regarded as of lesser importance—output was
unprecedentedly low, relative to available inputs
of capital and labor, at the business cycle trough.
The second, he argued, was essential: Improve  -
ments in software development were allowing
businesses to rapidly reengineer business proces  -
ses, with resulting increased long-term produc-
tivity growth. For years, he argued, major inputs
of increasingly powerful ICT hardware generated
little gain because software engineering lagged.
Now, gains in output per work hour were being
seen in both the manufacturing and nonmanu-
Anderson and Kliesen
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longer for development of idiosyncratic systems,
Greenspan’s argument was consistent with the
history of modern computer networking.5
1993
Discussion continued at the February meeting.
Members noted the 3 percent increase in labor
productivity in 1992 and asked why the staff pro-
jected a 1.3 percent pace during 1993. The staff
noted the 1.3 percent pace was an increase from
their previous projection of 1 percent. At the March
meeting, the Chairman noted: “Productivity is
picking up in a fairly substantial way, and I sus-
pect it is basically real.” At the August meeting,
Governor Angell emphasized the discordance in
the data:
Productivity has been a real puzzle for me.
Clearly, if your forecast gets really thrown awry
you say it’s a puzzle; and part of my real eco-
nomic forecast for [1993] has certainly missed
the mark. I really just don’t understand pro-
ductivity. I don’t understand how we can have
a decline in productivity for the business sector
of 1½ and 2½ percent two quarters in a row
when productivity in manufacturing has been
rising at 4½ to 5 percent!
At the following meeting, he noted that revisions
to the national income accounts had worsened
the puzzle: “To make it even worse, the revisions
seem to show productivity trends higher than
we thought they were. We’ve got productivity
trends [that are] very, very high.” The Chairman
noted: “The more I look at the data the more I’m
inclined to believe, as some of you have hinted,
that there is something wrong with the numbers
we are looking at. It’s just not credible to me that
we can have a significant rise in employment
and in hours both from the payroll series and the
household series—two measures that are about
as independent as one can get of an economic
phenomenon—and say that the GDP indicates
productivity declined in the first half of this year.”
1994-1995
Both the data and the Committee’s discussions
proceeded, meeting by meeting, largely in the
same fashion as the previous years. In our judg-
ment, little is gained by a detailed review except
for the meeting in December 1995, which has
been cited by a number of authors including
Blinder and Reis (2005). The Chairman offered
“a broad hypothesis about where the economy is
going over the longer term and what the underly-
ing forces are.” He argued that anecdotal evidence
from industry-level sources demonstrated that
purchases of equipment and software were chang-
ing business in permanent, fundamental ways but
poor data quality made the change difficult to
observe: “One would certainly assume that we
would see this in the productivity data, but it is
difficult to find it there. In my judgment there are
several reasons, the most important of which is
that the data are lousy.” Further, he argued, such
shifts are infrequent: “The underlying technology
changes that support this hypothesis really appear
only once every century, or 50 years, or some-
thing like that as best I can judge.” Inflation was
restrained because technological change had
increased job insecurity and eroded human capital,
causing both unusually restrained wage increases
in the tight labor market relative to the historical
record and a desire by workers for longer-term
contracts (5 to 6 years). Furthermore, advances in
ICT had reduced infrastructure and back-office
costs, including communications and transport
costs per unit of value added. He emphasized his
continuing skepticism regarding productivity
statistics and reiterated that businesses and indus-
tries must reorganize—often a slow process—to
take full advantage of major technological innova-
tions. With respect to monetary policy, he noted:
“It is unclear exactly how [the reorganization]
fits into our policy process. But I think it is impor-
tant to put this point on the table, and I present
it as a hypothesis since it is something that we
will not be sure is the appropriate assessment
of our changing world for probably five to ten
Anderson and Kliesen
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5 The Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie-Mellon was estab-
lished in 1984 to advance software engineering standards and
practices. Also in 1984, the University of California at Berkeley
released version 4.2 of BSD Unix, which included a complete
TCP/IP (transmission control protocol/Internet protocol) network-
ing implementation. Novell’s NetWare was released in various
versions between 1983 and 1986 using IPX (internetwork packet
exchange) and TCP/IP protocols. In late 1994, Microsoft released its
own 32-bit network solution for certain versions of Windows 3.11.years.” To bolster further his argument that actual
productivity gains were greater than those in
published data, the Chairman cited rapidly
increasing profits.6
Former Federal Reserve Governor Laurence H.
Meyer (2004) noted that the Chairman’s views
on the productivity acceleration were informed
primarily by contacts in the business sector. Data
available through the late 1990s, for example,
suggested that the services-producing sector had
achieved no productivity gains in 20 years—an
unlikely event.
1996
The most important information presented
to the Committee during 1996 was a productivity
study conducted at the Chairman’s behest by two
Board staff members, Carol Corrado and Larry
Slifman (1999). A number of authors have noted
that, by 1996, the Chairman had been question-
ing the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) official
productivity figures for three years (e.g., see
Woodward, 2000, pp. 171-74). Of particular con-
cern were services-producing sectors, where little
or no measured productivity gain had been found
in the past two decades. Suspicion fell primarily
on incorrect price indices for the sectors’ outputs
because mismeasurement would impose a down-
ward bias on measured real output. The Corrado-
Slifman study concluded that the data did not
support a productivity acceleration, but that it was
unlikely actual productivity in unincorporated
services-producing businesses had decreased
during the past two decades by approximately a
half percent per year, despite published measured
productivity so doing. Woodward (2000, p. 174)
writes that “Greenspan was delighted.”
1997
Throughout the year, Committee members
brought to the table numerous anecdotes regarding
firms pursuing capital investment to increase
productivity rather than expand capacity. Staff
projections for trend productivity remained mod-
est at approximately a 1 percent annual pace,
decreasing somewhat late in the year based on
staff judgment that strong actual productivity
growth at rates near 2½ to 3 percent was “a spurt.”
At the February meeting, the staff estimated
that productivity during the fourth quarter had
increased at a 2½ percent pace, and yet reduced
the projection of trend productivity growth to 0.9
percent from an “optimistic” 1.1 percent. Governor
Alice Rivlin noted: “The productivity data remain
significantly mysterious; the low increases do not
seem to fit with other indicators.” The Chairman
responded bluntly to suggestions that productivity
growth had not picked up: “So, the productivity
gains implicit in these data [the anecdotal reports]
are larger than the ones we are getting in the offi-
cial data. The one thing we know about the official
data on productivity is that they are wrong.”
At the March meeting, the Chairman noted
that “productivity is badly underestimated and
indeed may actually be accelerating.” He argued
that productivity in the nonfinancial corporate
sector must be increasing at approximately the
same rate as wages because unit labor costs were
not increasing and corporate profitability was
robust. At the May meeting, the staff increased
their projected trend productivity growth to a 1.2
percent pace and suggested that the recent pro-
ductivity acceleration was little more than might
be expected with a “surge in aggregate demand.”
The Chairman noted that average hourly compen-
sation data suggested productivity growth of
approximately 3 percent between the first quarters
of 1996 and 1997—but the data suggested a long-
term decrease in productivity in the noncorporate
business sector that “makes no sense.
At the July meeting, senior staff discussed
the tendency for productivity gains to induce
increases in aggregate demand (both producers’
durable equipment and household spending) that
outstrip increases in supply: “There is a bigger
6 The indicator value of increasing profits as a signal of increased
productivity has a long history; see, for example, comments by
Edward Boehne during the February 1983 FOMC meeting. The
Board staff’s productivity trend rate, as of February 1983, was
approximately 1 percent, versus 2½ percent earlier in the postwar
period. The Board staff was forecasting actual productivity growth
of  2½ percent in 1983 and 1½ percent in 1984, driven by manu-
facturing, with not as much going on in the services sector. In the
FOMC transcripts, Board research director Kichline notes that some
interesting things happened in 1982. One is that productivity
started rising very early.
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demand and consumer spending that actually
causes the net effect of this improvement in pro-
ductivity to be expansionary for the economy.”
The meetings during the balance of the year con-
tinued these same themes. Few new issues arose.
1998
The year 1998 was pivotal. As the economic
expansion strengthened, the Committee focused
on the role of the productivity acceleration in fore-
stalling higher inflation.7 At the February meeting,
published data showed a sharp increase in pro-
ductivity growth: Productivity in the nonfinancial
corporate sector had grown at a 2.1 percent pace
during the fourth quarter and increased 3.2 per-
cent from 1996:Q4 to 1997:Q4, a full percentage
point higher than during the comparable year-
earlier period. Yet, the staff was projecting slower
productivity growth during 1998, followed by a
modest rebound in 1999. Members noted that,
during the previous year, the staff had estimated
the trend growth rate of productivity at ¼ of a
percentage point; if correct, this slow increase,
in the views of some members, portended higher
inflation.8 The staff assuaged fears by arguing
that the projected growth of output was less than
the growth of potential output and an increasing
flow of cheap imports would further temper infla-
tionary pressures.
The February meeting was noteworthy for a
rare candid discussion of the dynamic linkages,
as viewed by senior staff, among labor demand,
wages, and labor productivity. The Chairman
asked: “How significant is the correlation between
nominal compensation and productivity?” The
staff responded that the rate of wage increase may
be regarded as predetermined [if not exogenous]
during the period for which the Committee wished
to discuss the path of inflation: “The correlation
is very weak in the short run and the lags are so
long that the largest compensation increases tend
to occur when productivity increases are begin-
ning to fall near the end of a cyclical expansion.”
Another staff member explained that, in a regres-
sion, nonfarm business productivity is not a sig-
nificant factor in explaining nominal wage gains:
“We know that real wage aspirations, loosely based
on productivity, ought to be an important factor
in conditioning wage demands, but businesses
may not be willing to grant the wage increases.
To the extent that fluctuations in productivity do
not show up in wages, the first round effects will
show through to profit margins rather than nomi-
nal compensation.” The Chairman suggested that
both workers and employers might be more for-
ward looking than the staff described, negotiating
labor contracts consistent with expected produc-
tivity growth. Furthermore, he suggested the
likelihood of an endogenous component to pro-
ductivity growth itself: “[W]hen nominal wages
are beginning to accelerate, then business esca-
lates its efforts to reduce costs and improve pro-
ductivity. So, if that model were functioning in a
meaningful sense, then a significant rise in nomi-
nal wages could very well merely reflect the fact
that productivity was rising and therefore unit
labor costs were not.” Senior staff members cau-
tioned that the long-run impact of more-rapid
productivity growth on inflation was likely small.
They noted that in model simulations where pro-
ductivity growth increases by 1 percentage point
and is sustained at that pace for a decade, “The
simulations provide the cautionary note that these
favorable effects on inflation are temporary…
inflation will begin to pick up if unemployment
is held at that lower rate, even if the trend in pro-
ductivity is tilted up permanently.” In the simula-
tions, more-rapid productivity growth only briefly
attenuates inflation: Within a year, the path of unit
labor cost is unchanged as nominal compensation
growth rises to reflect the higher productivity
growth.
The staff also outlined a second mechanism in
which more-rapid productivity growth increases
rather than decreases inflationary pressures:
“A faster trend for productivity increases demand
Anderson and Kliesen
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7 The unemployment rate for the civilian noninstitutional popula-
tion, as measured by the household survey, had peaked in 1992 at
7.5 percent. By 1997, it had fallen to 4.9 percent, most recently
achieved in 1973 as the “Great Inflation” was beginning. In 1998,
unemployment averaged 4.5 percent; in 1999, 4.2 percent; and at
its cyclical low in 2000, 4.0 percent.
8 Currently published figures, as of this writing, are 2.7 percent for
1997:Q4 and 3.0 percent 1996:Q4–1997:Q4 (versus 3.9 percent
1995:Q4–1996:Q4).substantially, as the accelerator effects associated
with attempts to keep capital growing in pace with
the more-rapid growth in output cause investment
to jump, and as consumption rises with perma-
nent income. However, supply only picks up
gradually, in line with faster productivity growth.”
The March meeting began with the staff
acknowledging that their previous real GDP
growth forecast was too low. Yet, the staff fore-
casted first-quarter real GDP to grow at a 3.1 per-
cent pace and labor productivity to decrease at a
–2.2 percent pace. The staff argued that such a
drop was not “implausible” given the increase in
labor productivity during the previous two years
relative to the staff’s underlying trend: “If we have
it right, a movement back toward the trend line
was to be expected over time—and, given the
erratic character of the series, a substantial drop
in some quarter would be far from shocking.”
Committee members agreed that extreme uncer-
tainty surrounds both the near-term increase and
long-run trend in productivity. Several members
noted that the staff’s combined labor market and
productivity projections implied sharp increases
in unit labor costs and, given the Committee’s
markup-pricing analytical framework, higher
inflation: 3 percent rates in the core CPI and core
personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price
indices. The staff counseled caution because other
“special factors” were constraining inflation:
It was supply uncertainties—questions about
whether the economy might be able to sustain
faster expansion through faster productivity
growth and a higher level of resource utiliza-
tion than suggested by history—that deterred
the Committee from tightening last fall, and
those uncertainties have not been resolved.
Despite a low unemployment rate and anec-
dotes of strains in labor markets, wage and
compensation inflation still seems to be mov-
ing up only slowly. Price inflation remains
largely quiescent, and a resumption of robust
investment spending in the first quarter should
keep industrial capacity ample.
The Chairman repeated his skepticism of the
productivity data:
The productivity numbers are very rough
estimates because we are measuring a whole
set of product outputs from one set of data and
a whole set of labor inputs from a different set.
That they come out even remotely measuring
actual labor productivity is open to question…
the BLS estimates that output per hour
increased at a 6.3 percent annual rate in the
third quarter of 1997. It just is not possible for
productivity to increase that fast.
At the May meeting, the staff projected
slower near-term, but more-rapid longer-term,
productivity growth. Responding to data revisions,
the staff increased their projection of trend pro-
ductivity growth to a 1½ percent pace. Some mem-
bers were skeptical: Why should an increase in
trend productivity growth reduce trend growth in
unit labor costs, when economic theory suggests
that long-run increases in wages and productivity
move together? The Chairman reemphasized his
faith in the productivity acceleration: “The more
interesting data provide increasing evidence that
the underlying trend of productivity is moving
up…It is clear that a very significant acceleration
in productivity has occurred compared with the
previous trend. A goodly part, perhaps most of it
though not all, is attributable to a pickup in the
rate of capital deepening. There clearly have been
improvements in the quality of labor and because
the residual, which we call total factor productiv-
ity, has gone up as well.”
At the June meeting, the staff’s economic
outlook echoed the Chairman’s comments at the
May meeting—labor productivity had accelerated,
and the increase was due to capital deepening
and improved multifactor productivity. Unit labor
costs were projected as unchanged, with wage
increases offset by productivity gains; labor com-
pensation, measured by the employment cost
index, was projected to increase at a 3½ percent
rate. At this meeting, the Chairman emphasized
that gains in productivity, in certain circumstances,
engender increases in inflation, rather than
decreases. “[A]s productivity growth has accel-
erated, expectations about earnings over the long
run have moved up. This has created a major
increase in stock prices and a virtuous circle
wealth effect. We end up with (1) much higher
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of the acceleration in productivity that has
occurred.”
Productivity was little discussed at the
remaining meetings of 1998, as the Committee
confronted the Russian debt default, the Asian
financial crisis, and the rescue of the hedge fund
Long-Term Capital Management. At the August
meeting, a few members expressed doubt regard-
ing continued strong productivity growth, while
the Chairman expressed confidence in continued
strong growth. At the December meeting, the staff
noted that incoming data on GDP had been fully
consistent with the more-rapid trend productivity
growth accepted by the staff earlier in the year.
1999
Committee meetings during 1999 contained
a wide range of viewpoints. Some members feared
inflation based on their historical experience with
tight labor markets and Phillips curve models.
The staff feared inflation if wealth effects induced
by the productivity acceleration caused aggregate
demand to expand in advance of aggregate supply.
The Chairman pressed forward his argument that
the economy was benefiting from a technology
shock on a scale not experienced since the nine-
teenth century.
At the February meeting, the Chairman
noted that productivity increased during the third
and fourth quarters at 4.7 and 4.8 percent annual
rates, respectively, and that unit labor costs for
nonfinancial corporations had increased over the
four quarters of 1998 just 0.2 percent, with com-
pensation per hour increasing 4.0 percent and
productivity 3.8 percent. The staff, however, saw
the productivity acceleration as sowing the seeds
of their own demise. Productivity gains, they
argued, were strengthening aggregate demand,
especially for producers’ durable goods, more
rapidly than increasing aggregate supply: “Greater
capital spending does raise the productivity of
labor and the level of potential output over time,
but its more significant effect in the short run is
on demand. Thus, policy must be appreciably
firmer if demand surprises on the upside, even
if it is productivity-enhancing spending that con-
stitutes the surprise” [italics added]. The Chairman
argued that staff projections of rising inflation were
wrong because the economy had experienced a
“fundamental” change. He discarded his previous
rationale for low inflation—workers’ fear of job
obsolescence, layoffs, and outsourcing:
How is it possible, first, for hourly compensa-
tion growth to be flat or falling in an ever-
tightening labor market? Let me begin by
suggesting what does not explain it. You may
recall that two or three years ago I was arguing
that fear of job obsolescence was a major factor
suppressing the nominal increase in compensa-
tion per hour. That factor clearly has not gotten
worse; if anything, it has eased…[A]n increase
in uncertainty and the fear of job loss amongst
workers cannot account for this extraordinary
combination of low unemployment and no
acceleration in hourly compensation.
He cited globalization and its increased competi-
tion as denying pricing power to business:
The argument is basically that tradable goods
prices are being significantly held down by
excess world capacity and that the arbitraging
into the nontradable goods areas that occurs
within economies, largely through wages, is
the reason why service price inflation, which
arguably has very little in the way of direct
international globalization components, also
has been restrained appreciably. In the United
States this process has been augmented by a
dramatic increase in the backlog of new 
technologies.
Moreover, he argued, it was unlikely that increases
in aggregate demand would exceed gains in aggre-
gate supply because employers would offset cost
pressures through capital investment:
[T]he synergies that have evolved over recent
years have created a large pool of potential
capital investments that firms can dip into to
obtain a rate of return in excess of the cost of
capital. We have seen considerable evidence
of this in the sense that rates of return every-
where seem to be moving up.
…[W]e are getting a rapid increase in oppor-
tunities for investment in new technology. It
is overwhelming the expansion of demand, and
the acceleration in the downward adjustment
of prices suggests that we have a very large
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they are implemented, are displacing labor
and effectuating a very significant increase
in multifactor productivity. That in turn has
spilled over into labor productivity.
…[I]t is evident that whenever nominal wage
pressures have surfaced, producers have cho-
sen to dip into the available technology to sub-
stitute profitable capital for labor. This has
made the growth of potential output per hour
variable; indeed, it’s a function of nominal
wage increases. The reason is that if nominal
wage increases pick up, there is clear evidence
in recent years that producers will endeavor to
dip into that untapped pool of technological
capital projects.
At the March meeting, the staff increased
their estimate of trend productivity growth to a
1.9 percent pace and foresaw little inflationary
pressure. Committee members expressed concern
that the more-rapid productivity growth would
not continue. The Chairman noted that repeated
staff projections of slower economic growth and
more-rapid inflation had been incorrect. He noted
that the combination of a slower rate of increase
in compensation per hour and accelerated pro-
ductivity had lowered the growth in unit labor
costs for the nonfinancial corporate area to 0.1
percent over the past four quarters. He emphasized
again that measurement error plagued published
productivity data, particularly the noncorporate
business sector where published data suggested
that “measured annual productivity had declined
about 2 percent per annum on average since the
late 1970s. That is just not credible.”
The discussion of inflation intensified at the
May meeting: The primary question was, with a
4 percent unemployment rate, is monetary policy
consistent with stable inflation? Output grew at
a 4 percent pace during the previous four quarters,
with strong productivity gains and decreases in
broad measures of nominal wage and price
increases. Yet, the staff argued that projected pro-
ductivity growth was inadequate to sustain long-
run outcomes of 4 percent unemployment and
near-constant inflation: Price inflation would
increase unless domestic demand softened.
President Robert T. Parry (San Francisco Fed),
seeking a measure of the uncertainty of the pro-
ductivity forecast, was representative of the con-
cerns: “Estimates of the productivity trend seem
to have been revised quite frequently in the last
few years. To me, this suggests greater uncertainty
about the productivity forecast. Wouldn’t you
have to conclude that the uncertainties associated
with our forecast of real output and inflation must
be greater given the uncertainties that are associ-
ated with the productivity forecast?”  Governor
Meyer, however, accepted a shift in trend but
argued that the staff likely had gone too far with
their increases in the trend rate: 
The case for an increase in trend productiv-
ity growth is now more compelling after the
strength in productivity over the last five
quarters—and especially after the last two
quarters—than it was based on the data for
1996 and 1997. And I believe the staff’s pattern
of incremental upward steps in trend produc-
tivity growth makes sense, with some acceler-
ation in productivity beginning in late 1995
and a further acceleration in 1998. My problem
with the staff forecast is that its projection of
a 2¼ percent productivity trend over the fore-
cast period [the following 8 quarters] is just too
aggressive for my taste.
The Chairman acknowledged the risks of his
preferred policy: “[T]he interesting issue is why
wages are not rising faster if productivity is doing
what all the evidence suggests it is doing. We have
a unique anomaly. Credulity gets strained more
and more the longer it goes on. It is hard to avoid
the conclusion that there is an increasing imbal-
ance here that we have to address.”
At the June meeting, the staff projected trend
productivity growth at a 2¼ percent pace, more
rapid than other forecasters. (The Council of
Economic Advisers, for example, projected a 1.6
percent rate.) At the August meeting, the staff’s
model simulations suggested that if productivity
growth slowed and labor markets remained tight,
inflation would accelerate. The Chairman saw no
slowing of productivity growth:
I find no evidence yet that the increase in the
rate of growth of productivity has slowed at all.
To be sure, the official published data for the
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growth of 1.3 percent and will be revised to
below 1 percent, would suggest a very signifi-
cant slowing. The problem is that about 2 per-
centage points of that number reflects the
change in the statistical discrepancy. And that
published second quarter number is not in any
way consistent with what we know is going on
out in the real world.
…The figures in the data that we are looking
at from the income side show productivity
growth over the four quarters ending in the
second quarter of around 3½ percent.
…Where is the inflation? It is not showing up
anywhere in the basic price data. And the
people out in the business world with whom
I talk, and it’s a fairly extensive group, keep
complaining about their inability to raise
prices. I do think that wages will continue to
increase if productivity growth continues to
rise. But since this would mean that unit labor
costs would be little changed, that won’t be a
source of price pressures.
…Inflation is clearly prone to acceleration
should the increase in the growth of produc-
tivity slow or even stabilize. That hasn’t hap-
pened yet as far as I can tell.
The Committee increased its target for the federal
funds rate by 25 basis points.
At the October meeting, some members
pressed for further increases in the federal funds
target. The staff forecast called for slowing pro-
ductivity growth and increasing inflation. The
Chairman asked whether the staff model’s foun-
dations were adequately dynamic to capture the
extraordinary supply-side changes that he recog-
nized, noting that correct policy action hinged
on one’s judgment regarding the magnitude (and
sign) of a “second derivative.” He suggested that
the staff models inadequately captured interac-
tions between the demand and supply sides of
the macroeconomy: 
I see as growing evidence that the models with
which we have been trying to explain how the
American economy functions are becoming
increasingly obsolete. It is not that the econo-
metric structure of the models is inappropriate,
but certain simple assumptions are made in
their structure that are driving the results we
observe and are creating at least the presump-
tion that we are missing something important.9
He asserted that the “second derivative” of pro-
ductivity had been positive since 1995; that is,
the longer-run trend growth rate of productivity
had continued to increase.
October’s discussion continued at the
November meeting, as Committee members asked
how long the Chairman’s second derivative could
remain positive before returning to its “traditional”
value of zero. Members almost uniformly reported
robust productivity gains in their Districts, and
the staff increased their projected productivity
growth rate by several tenths of a percent, in part
due to revisions to national income accounts
data.10 The Chairman asked members to “follow
his lead.” Although incoming data supported his
view, he conceded that productivity accelerations
create “unbalanced” expansions that cannot con-
tinue. He cautioned the Committee that neither
the large current account deficit nor the expanding
employment of marginal workers could continue
unchecked: Eventually, the imbalance between
aggregate demand and supply would be resolved
through increases in long-term real interest rates.
“The trouble,” he notes, “is that the lags are invari-
ably quite long, and we do not know how much
rate tightening [in monetary policy] is required
to bring supply and demand into balance.”
The year’s final meeting, on December 21, was
quiet. No significant new analysis was presented.
The Chairman repeated his belief that increases
in the growth rate of productivity—a positive
second derivative—could not continue indefi-
nitely. But few price pressures were noted, and
the Committee agreed that a policy action would
be unwise on the eve of the century date change.
2000
The Committee during 2000 came to regard
further increases in productivity growth as
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supply-side technology shocks echo, perhaps unintentionally,
those of Nobel laureate Edward Prescott.
10 For discussions of productivity revisions and the national income
account revisions, see Anderson and Kliesen (2006).unwelcome, lest stronger aggregate demand place
upward pressure on inflation. (Ironically, the fol-
lowing year, the Committee came to regard further
increases as a potential cause of unwelcome dis-
inflation or, worse, deflation.)
The year began with optimism. At the
February meeting, the staff increased their esti-
mate of trend productivity growth to a 3 percent
annual rate, double the pace of the 1980s and
early 1990s. President Cathy E. Minehan (Boston
Fed) noted that the staff’s productivity growth
projection was more rapid than almost all other
forecasters. Governor Meyer defended the forecast,
saying, “[T]he main difference is that the staff
here has a very strong view of the interaction of
supply and demand. This common force of pro-
ductivity is affecting both demand and supply. I
think they have been proven very accurate in that.
One doesn’t see that perspective in most of the
private forecasts.” The Chairman agreed and went
further: “I think that is exactly right. In fact, the
risks to the staff forecast may very well be on the
up side. The probability that their forecast is too
low is by no means negligible.” Inflation concerns
were widespread. President Michael H. Moskow
(Chicago Fed) cited advice from his academic
advisory council; others cited labor market pres-
sure. Governor Edward M. Gramlich, in counter-
point, saw few inflationary pressures, noting that
unit labor costs were near constant and that the
Blue Chip survey was not forecasting an increase.
But Governor Meyer saw inflation: “[My] judgment
is based on the still more robust growth at the
already very high labor utilization rate, by the
dissipation or reversal of the favorable relative
price shocks that have been restraining inflation,
and by some signs of incipient pressure on nomi-
nal compensation and inflation.” He explained
that the Chairman’s virtuous circle had become
villainous: 
[There is] a growing appreciation of the impor-
tance of higher productivity growth in explain-
ing recent macroeconomic experience…the
key challenge for monetary policy today derives
from the persistent imbalance between the
growth in supply and demand…higher trend
productivity growth appears to have had simul-
taneous effects on demand as well as supply
via the investment boom to take advantage of
profit  able opportunities and via the consump-
tion boom driven by the surge in equity values
and perhaps expectations of higher permanent
income.
He cited staff forecasts wherein “0.2 percent higher
productivity growth results in ½ percentage point
faster growth in basic demand. That’s the prob-
lem I think we are facing.” In his remarks, the
Chairman expressed similar concern: “[I]nflation
will stay down because of the acceleration in
productivity. But, ultimately, if we do not solve
the problem of the gap, meaning that if the accel-
eration in productivity leads to continued expec-
tations of accelerating earnings per share, the
only way to eliminate the wealth effect, which
has to be eliminated, is for the market rate used
by investors to calculate the present value of
expected earnings to rise.” He cautioned that
“too aggressive” an increase in the federal funds
policy target could “crack the [stock] market”
and lead to financial instability. He proposed a
25-basis-point increase in the federal funds rate
target, despite no evidence of increasing inflation.
The Committee agreed in consensus.
At the March meeting, the staff again increased
their estimate of trend productivity, by 0.2 per-
centage points, to 3.2 percent. Most members
continued to foresee inflationary pressures. Staff
noted that “absent a continuation of the almost
astonishing productivity gains of the second half
of last year, there is a clear risk that those [infla-
tionary pressures] pressures will mount in com-
ing months.” Perhaps surprisingly, no member
advanced the argument that investment in ICT
capital had permitted businesses to reorganize to
profitably employ workers previously too costly
to employ, thereby increasing both demand and
supply—an argument that had seemingly been
popular among the Committee members only
shortly beforehand.
Forecasts of higher inflation lent a grim tone
to the May meeting. The staff projected a leveling-
off of productivity growth at a modest 1.5 percent
pace, but the Chairman argued, based on corpo-
rate profits, that productivity growth was as much
as fourfold faster. Staff noted that inflation was
tame: Although energy prices had boosted head-
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(omitting food and energy prices) was projected
to increase only 2 percent during 2001. The staff
recommended an aggressive 75-basis-point
increase in the federal funds rate target to fore-
stall possible inflation. The Chairman emphasized
that inflationary pressures are not visible:
What is remarkable at this stage is not that
inflationary forces are picking up…when we
look through the configuration of unit costs,
the estimate we end up with is that unit costs
have fallen over the last six months for nonfi-
nancial corporations, indeed for nonfarm busi-
ness generally…all of the price acceleration we
have seen reflects widening profit margins…
there is no evidence at this stage that we are
experiencing a real underlying deterioration
in inflation of the kind that we typically have
seen in the past.
Nevertheless, he recommended a 50-basis-point
increase in the federal funds rate target: “[T]he
evidence indicates that productivity, indeed per-
haps underlying GDP, is still accelerating…there
is as yet no compelling evidence that inflationary
pressures are easing, I believe it would be a mis-
take not to stay asymmetric and our press release
should reflect such a decision.”
At the June meeting, the momentum toward
fighting inflation continued. Governor Gramlich
cautioned against rapid policy change based on
inflation forecasts: “Until now the real economy
has been rocketing ahead at a seemingly unsus-
tainable rate and there was at least a whiff in the
air that underlying inflation was picking up. Now
real growth has slowed, quite quickly in fact, and
the signs of acceleration in inflation do not look
so strong either.” He interpreted the incoming
data as suggesting little inflationary pressure:
[T]emporary factors slowed the core inflation
rate in 1998 and 1999 and these factors have
now reversed, showing up as somewhat higher
core inflation in early 2000. Abstracting from
this reversal, there has been some but not that
much of a rise in core inflation.
…Nobody has mentioned long-term inflation
expectations, but they have been remarkably
stable, remarkably unresponsive to the oil price
increases. In addition, the Treasury nominal/
real interest rate spread looked as if it was
increasing last month, but it has moved back
down to fairly acceptable levels.
…It is at least possible that the Fed has already
done enough tightening and that we can stand
back and examine our work.
There are grounds for thinking that we have
done enough already. If the long-run core infla-
tion rate is about 2 percent and the long-run
real interest rate is around 4 percent—which
can be read from either the TIP [sic] [TIPS,
Treasury inflation-protected securities] market
or inflation-corrected nominal interest rates—
the nominal federal funds rate should be at
least 6 percent for a balanced economy. Throw
in 50 basis points for leaning against the wind
or adjusting for the balance of risks and we are
at the present funds rate.
In fact, the business cycle dating committee
of the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) would announce more than a year later,
on November 26, 2001, that a cyclical peak
occurred during March 2001, beginning a stubborn
recession during which the Committee would
reduce its federal funds rate target to 1 percent
(on June 25, 2003).
At the August meeting, the staff again
increased their projection of productivity growth,
largely in response to revised data that suggested
productivity growth at a 5 to 6 percent pace. The
projected trend growth rate was revised upward
to 3½ percent. Nevertheless, they predicted
increased inflationary pressure due to tight labor
markets.
2001
The slowing economic activity of late 2000
became widespread during 2001. The year began
with a January 3 conference call triggered by weak
incoming economic data. Committee members
appeared to regard weakness in productivity
growth as primarily cyclical. The Chairman noted:
“I think it is important to indicate in our press
statement that there is little evidence to date of
any deterioration in the long-term advances in
technology and the related expansion in produc-
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members.
Optimism continued at the January 30-31
meeting. The staff projected that multifactor pro-
ductivity was “still growing rapidly…reflected
in a strong expansion of permanent income.”
At the May meeting, slower business invest-
ment spending caused the staff to reduce projected
productivity growth, which also affected the infla-
tion outlook: “The reduced pace of structural
productivity also underlies the upward revision
that we have made to our inflation forecast. In
essence, the increases in nominal compensation
that we are projecting imply more price pressure
than we had previously forecast. In that regard,
the incoming data on wages and prices have just
about uniformly been to the high side of our
expectations.”
At the June meeting, the staff projected slower
productivity growth and “upward pressure on
price inflation.” Core inflation was projected to
change little because of the beneficial effects of
falling energy prices and increased “slack in labor
and product markets.”
At the August meeting, revised national
income data showed somewhat slower produc-
tivity growth than previously believed. Because
prior-period inflation numbers were largely
unchanged, the staff noted that less of the “out-
standing inflation performance of the late 1990s”
could be attributed to productivity gains.
No new issues regarding productivity surfaced
at the October meeting. At the November meeting,
the staff reduced projections of productivity
growth to reflect the reallocation by business and
government of productive capital into increased
security following the September 2001 terrorist
attacks. Further, both Committee members and the
staff recognized that a productivity deceleration
might cause aggregate demand to weaken faster
than (or prior to) aggregate supply, causing unwel-
come further disinflation. The staff noted, with
irony, that many who had spent their careers pro-
moting the virtues of slower inflation now found
it necessary to promote more-rapid inflation. The
situation was serious, if not precarious: The fed-
eral funds rate was at 2½ percent, the core PCE
inflation rate was at 1½ percent, productivity
was increasing, unit labor costs were falling, and
economic activity was slowing. Considerable
discussion at this meeting related to the mention
of productivity in the press release because the
Committee wished to acknowledge that (i) near-
term productivity might be reduced by the reallo-
cation of resources toward security efforts but
(ii) trend productivity would not be harmed.
Projections of trend productivity growth were
further reduced at the December meeting, to near
2 percent for 2001 and 1½ percent for 2002 (ver-
sus 2½ percent in 1998 and 1999). When trend
productivity was accelerating, the staff empha-
sized the interaction between aggregate demand
and supply. Now, with productivity decelerating,
the same analysis caused concern regarding
unwelcome disinflation—or even deflation. The
Chairman noted that, because the federal funds
rate was at a low level, it might be wise to leave
the federal funds rate target unchanged for a time.
2002
On November 26, 2001, the NBER’s business
cycle dating committee announced March 2001 as
the cyclical peak in economic activity. (On July 17,
2003, the committee would announce November
2001 as the cyclical trough.) At the FOMC, infla-
tionary concerns were muted during the year as
the focus shifted to supporting recovery.
At the January 2002 meeting, the staff pro-
jected that the economy was close to a cyclical
trough—fourth-quarter GDP growth was near
zero.11 Trend productivity growth apparently
had slowed, but some rebound was predicted in
2003. During the meeting’s second day, newly
released fourth-quarter GDP data suggested that
productivity (measured as output per hour in the
nonfarm business sector) had increased at a 3.1
percent pace, more rapidly than anticipated.
11 The meeting opened with presentations regarding the zero bound
problem in monetary policy, which arises when a central bank,
working with an overnight interest rate as its single policy instru-
ment, finds that the desired setting for that rate is below zero.
Nominal interest rates cannot be less than zero (absent a subsidy
or partial forgiveness of a debt). If the policy rate is at the zero
bound and inflation is falling, then the real policy rate will be
increasing; if, in turn, this further attenuates economic activity
such that inflation falls further (or becomes negative), a cumula-
tive process might be launched that drives the economy into an
extended downward spiral.
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would provide support for future capital invest-
ment and strengthen aggregate demand. Chairman
Greenspan noted incongruities among incoming
data regarding profits, productivity, and business
investment: If the fourth quarter in fact was the
cyclical trough, then productivity growth in that
quarter should have been quite slow, followed by
a rebound as the economy rebounded. Instead,
fourth-quarter productivity growth was strong
and profits higher than expected. Data incon-
gruities caused productivity growth predictions
to seem even more uncertain than usual.
The March meeting focused on the risk that
continued strong productivity growth might cause
further disinflation, or even deflation. Productiv  -
ity was estimated to have increased in the fourth
quarter at a 5¼ percent pace. For the first quarter,
the staff had increased their forecast to a 5¾
percent pace. The Chairman, in his remarks,
applauded the economy reaching price stability
but noted that short rates were “in general” lower
than desired. He noted that there had been a
clear change in the economy: “My impression is
that we are looking at something different. This
is a different type of economy. This is a different
type of business cycle. We now seem to be at a
reasonably good point. We have come to that point
in part by good policy judgment and in part by
just plain luck.”
At the May meeting, the staff acknowledged
that productivity gains again had exceeded their
projections. The staff noted that these gains in
part might be cyclical, amplified by a higher-than-
usual uncertainty regarding firms’ future demand
and sales, and in part likely were structural. But
neither staff models nor intuition suggested a
clear division. News reports, the staff members
noted, suggested that layoffs at various firms had
forced remaining staff to work harder, increasing
stress and worker discontent; to some extent,
such actions would not be sustainable over the
long run. The Chairman noted that a slowing pace
of business investment might portend slower
future productivity growth.
The June meeting opened with three presen-
tations on inflation forecasting. One presentation
suggested that the pickup in productivity growth
during the mid-1990s, combined with the lagged
response of wages, explained most of the unantici-
pated decrease in inflation. The staff increased
their projected trend productivity growth to 2
percent and 2½ percent, respectively, during
2002 and 2003, close to the pace during the
“New Economy” second half of the 1990s. These
increased projections raised concern regarding
additional unwelcome disinflation. Relative to
the 1990s, however, the 2002-03 gain was associ-
ated with less business investment demand (capi-
tal deepening) and more gains from business
reengineering (multifactor productivity), reflect-
ing at least in part the shift in rapid productivity
growth from manufacturing (during the 1990s)
to the services-producing sector (since 2000).
Staff members noted also that recent productivity
gains, perhaps more than usual, were reflecting
firms’ intent to squeeze production increases
from existing employees because of uncertainty
regarding future sales.
At the August meeting, the Committee noted
that newly revised national income accounts data
had “largely left intact” historical growth in pro-
ductivity. At the September meeting, the staff
again increased their projection of productivity
growth in response to stronger-than-anticipated
spending and weaker-than-anticipated hours:
“We project an increase in nonfarm business
output per hour of about 4 percent in the current
quarter—a figure which, if realized, would bring
the four-quarter growth in labor productivity to
about 5¼ percent. Unlike the astonishing 7 to 8
percent increases that we saw at the turn of the
year, the more recent increases almost certainly
are not the result of businesses being surprised by
unexpected strength in demand.” The Chairman
noted the changing forces driving productivity
gains:
[B]usiness firms have expended a great deal of
effort to increase productivity through various
means, including the use of previously unex-
ploited efficiencies…that was a fairly solid
argument that could be made earlier this year,
but it gets pretty thin this far out into the recov-
ery. What we have is a very substantial multi-
factor productivity growth because clearly
we’re not getting very extensive capital deep-
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evident in the data. It’s a data dilemma, but the
answer is not that the data are faulty. Margins
actually have been flat for the last three quarters.
We are getting some price deflation in the
corporate sector. Part of the acceleration in
productivity is showing up in lower prices
rather than in higher profit margins. None  -
theless, the data look pretty solid and fairly
impressive, and one wonders why all the
corporate managers are so gloomy. They are
gloomy largely because they have no pricing
power. They see very weak nominal sales, with
the prices of many of their products falling
abruptly while the growth of their real output
is quite significant. Indeed, that’s where a
goodly part of the productivity gains are com-
ing from.
At the November meeting, the members
expressed heightened concern regarding the large
output gap and continuing disinflation pressures.
The Committee reduced the federal funds rate
target to 1¼ percent.
The year concluded with the meeting of
December 10. Once again, productivity had accel-
erated beyond even the staff’s optimistic projec-
tions. The staff noted that reported productivity
for the third quarter (the most recent data) had
been boosted by an unusual feature of the U.S.
statistical system: The output measure used in
its calculation is a series for nonfarm business
excluding the housing sector. Mortgage refinanc-
ing, which jumped in the third quarter, was treated
as an intermediate input to the housing sector
and, hence, was subtracted from total nonfarm
business output to obtain the productivity meas-
ure—resulting in a somewhat inflated measure
of the productivity increase. President J. Alfred
Broaddus (Richmond Fed) noted that the
Greenbook projected structural productivity to
grow at more than a 2 percent pace in both 2003
and 2004, generating increased profitability, strong
cash flows, and firming stock prices—all assisting
stronger investment spending. He argued that
the forecast’s risks likely were weighted toward
disappointment, especially regarding productiv-
ity growth—the forecast reflected an assumption
that multifactor productivity would increase at a
rate of 1½ percent in 2003 and 2004, slightly
above even its recent pace.
2003
Robust productivity growth was at the fore-
front of the Committee’s discussions during 2003.
While household spending remained modest,
business investment spending stubbornly refused
to increase. With the federal funds rate target
already low, further strong productivity growth
threatened additional unwelcome disinflation
and, worse, deflation.
The year’s first meeting, January 28-29, opened
with four presentations regarding monetary policy
rules. Although productivity did not enter as a
variable in the monetary policy rules in the four
opening presentations, it dominated the Com  -
mittee’s discussion thereafter. The staff forecast
called for accelerating economic activity after
midyear, with stronger trend productivity growth
and gains in real income and spending. The label
“jobless recovery” reappeared, with staff noting
that nonfarm payroll employment during the
fourth quarter (of 2002) was less than at the cycle
trough (2001:Q4), while labor productivity had
increased 3.75 percent. Arguing that recent pro-
ductivity gains had been achieved by “stretching”
existing workers and that hiring would likely
improve, the staff anticipated that actual labor
productivity would increase at a 1¾ percent pace
during 2003-04, somewhat below the projected
longer-run trend of a 2¼ to 2½ percent pace.
At the March 18 meeting, the staff found no
evidence that productivity growth was slowing.
Some members cautioned that the Committee
should be wary of the potential for further disin-
flation if the Iraq war or terrorist attacks caused
an economic slowdown. Beyond disinflation con-
cerns, members noted that strong productivity
growth would eventually support stronger eco-
nomic activity. Following the beginning of the
Iraq war on March 19, the Committee held tele-
phone conference calls on March 19 and April 1,
8, and 16. Productivity was mentioned only infre-
quently in these discussions, and then only to
note its continuing strength and that rapid pro-
ductivity increases were likely to dampen employ-
ment gains.
At the May 6 meeting, the staff noted that
rising productivity was allowing firms to shed
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during a period of sluggish output growth. The
Chairman noted that incoming numbers on pro-
duction and employment were “awful,” but pro-
ductivity growth was strong despite low capital
investment. He suggested that firms had focused
on increasing productive capacity during the
strong capital investment period of 1995-2000
while largely ignoring increasing inefficiencies—
“when the spending boom ended in the year 2000,
there was a cumulative level of inefficiencies sit-
ting there that were available for exploitation
with a relatively modest amount of additional
investment.”
At the June meeting, the primary topic was
monetary policy when overnight nominal interest
rates neared their zero lower bound. Staff noted
that the then-current federal funds rate target of
1¼ percent placed the Committee in a position it
had not experienced for a half century, and presen-
tations focused on unconventional policy tools—
“shaping interest rate expectations” by committing
to maintain the federal funds rate near zero for
an extended period and altering both the compo-
sition and size of the Federal Reserve balance
sheet. Staff discussed simulations of the Federal
Reserve Board/U.S. model, suggesting probabilities
as high as 40 percent that deflation would occur
during 2004 and 2005 (defined as the core PCE
index falling a cumulative ½ percent or more).
The staff noted that productivity accelerations
can be self-correcting if the productivity shock
increases aggregate demand faster than it increases
aggregate supply, a comforting observation but
seen as unlikely in the forecasts. The productivity
acceleration, once a fortuitous gift to the economy
that both reduced inflation and boosted economic
activity, risked becoming a scourge.
At the August meeting, however, the staff
forecast was upbeat. Aggregate demand growth
was stronger and exceeded estimates of the growth
of potential (that is, of aggregate supply) with
“stunning” productivity increases in the second
quarter. Explanations were few. The staff noted
that, “The intuition is that, as best we can figure
out, a large amount of restraint on the part of
employers is an important factor at this moment”—
the restraint being reflected in sluggish payroll
employment growth but rapid productivity
growth. The staff projected that hiring would
increase and productivity growth slow as business
confidence increased, but Committee members’
views differed from those of the staff and each
other—some argued business confidence was low,
others that it was high. The Chairman repeated
his opinion that businesses were exploiting oppor-
tunities arising from capital investments during
1995-2000: How could it be otherwise with weak
capital investment, strong productivity growth,
and businesses reporting that intense competition
left them no pricing power?
Productivity again was center stage at the
September meeting. Incoming data supported
the staff’s previous forecast of a recovery in eco-
nomic activity, particularly capital spending, yet
the “margin of slack” in labor and product markets
was expected to “recede only slowly” over the
next two years, with modest wage growth and
strong productivity growth resulting in minimal
increases in structural unit labor costs and a
decrease in headline CPI inflation from 2 percent
to 1 percent. Trend productivity was projected to
increase in 2004 and 2005, respectively, by 2½
and 2¾ percent.
The year closed quietly. At the October and
December meetings, the staff noted that continu-
ing strong productivity growth had attenuated
hiring and placed downward pressure on unit
labor costs; in addition, some members saw the
high level of slack in labor markets placing further
downward pressure on wages, unit labor costs,
and inflation.
CONCLUSION
Growth of productivity has a long history as
a discussion topic at Federal Open Market
Committee meetings. Unexpectedly strong pro-
ductivity growth during the early 1980s brought
forward arguments foreshadowing those of the
following two decades. How much should the
Committee risk its price stability goal to gamble
that nascent accelerations in productivity would
persist? If the Committee were to regard the risk
as unacceptable and tighten policy preemptively—
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models that do not incorporate the positive shock
to productivity growth—how much output would
be lost? And, how does this interact with the
FOMC’s dual mandate from the Congress to seek
both price stability and maximum sustainable
employment? The transcripts provide invaluable
evidence regarding the real-world dynamics of
group decisionmaking under conditions of per-
vasive uncertainty.
The transcripts make clear that Federal
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, relying on
anecdotal evidence and disaggregate data, recog-
nized the 1990s productivity acceleration before
both the FOMC staff and private forecasters. A
significant ingredient was higher earnings that
could be explained by no mechanism except unex-
pectedly rapid productivity growth. Widespread
recognition during the mid-1990s of the acceler-
ation of productivity was delayed by weaknesses
in measuring productivity. Initial aggregate data
for 1995 and 1996, for example, showed little
increase in measured productivity. Not until late
in the 1990s did revised data vindicate the
Chairman’s intuition.
Beginning during the mid-1990s, unantici-
pated productivity growth typically was regarded
by the Committee as a benevolent force that atten-
uated inflationary pressures by offsetting, in a
markup pricing model, largely predetermined
increases in wages. During the early 1990s, when
employment growth was sluggish and unemploy-
ment high, economic activity was boosted by the
wealth effects whereby aggregate demand tended
to increase before aggregate supply. Sentiment
changed during the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Then, the Committee became concerned that
wealth-induced increases in aggregate demand
might cause increased inflation, and the Com  -
mittee sought to reduce both household and busi-
ness spending through sharp increases in its target
rate. By 2003, slower economic activity turned
the tide again, and more-rapid productivity was
once again a desired benevolent partner in policy.
The FOMC’s experience with productivity
growth teaches several lessons. Anecdotal and
disaggregate data can be informative, sometimes
before changes become apparent in aggregate data.
Further, monetary policy, indeed, is an exercise
in risk management. Success in risk management
sometimes requires some gambling instincts.
During the 1990s, the FOMC’s gambling paid
handsome rewards. Policymaking by committee
is difficult, and the skill of a chairman to bring
consensus cannot be overvalued.
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